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FANON’S LES DAMNÉS DE LA TERRE: TRANSLATION, DE-
PHILOSOPHIZATION AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF VIOLENCE 
 
KATHRYN BATCHELOR 
 
There is significant circumstantial evidence to support the view that Sartre’s Critique de la 
raison dialectique, published in May 1960, played an important role in the shaping of 
Fanon’s Les Damnés de la terre, which was completed in July of the following year. The 
main accounts of Fanon’s interest in Sartre’s text are found in two sources: Simone de 
Beauvoir’s La Force des choses, published in 1963, and Annie Cohen-Solal’s Sartre, which 
was published in 1985 and which draws on an unpublished interview with Claude Lanzmann 
given in May 1983. Beauvoir’s account relies in part on her first-hand involvement in the 
encounter between Fanon and Sartre in Rome in July 1961, in part on second-hand 
information related by Lanzmann describing his meeting with Fanon in Tunis that had taken 
place sometime prior to that, almost certainly the same meeting that forms the major part of 
Cohen-Solal’s account.1 In Tunis, according to Cohen-Solal, Lanzmann found Fanon 
‘malade, […] mais tout en souffrant atrocement, il niait complètement sa souffrance. Il avait 
déjà lu la Critique de la raison dialectique, il nous en parla des heures et des heures’.2 
Beauvoir’s summary of Lanzmann’s account, presumably given to her much sooner after the 
event, offers a little more detail: 
[Lanzmann] trouva Fanon alité […] atteint d’une leucémie; d’après les médecins il ne 
survivrait pas plus d’un an. ‘Parlons d’autre chose’, dit-il tout de suite. Il posa des questions 
sur Sartre dont la philosophie l’avait marqué; il avait été passionné par la Critique de la 
raison dialectique, en particulier par les analyses sur la fraternité-terreur.3 
 
A much later series of recollections by Lanzmann of his meetings with Fanon in Tunis, 
provided in an interview with Jean Khalfa in 2005, indicates that Fanon told him ‘in his 
feverish voice, that the Jounoud [Algerian fighters] were reading the Critique de la raison 
 
 
dialectique’ and subsequently set up a trip for Lanzmann to the interior, saying to him on the 
eve of his departure: ‘Tomorrow you will see the interior […] and you will see the readers of 
Critique de la raison dialectique.’4 In the same interview, Lanzmann calls into question the 
accuracy of Fanon’s words, stating, in relation to his trip to the interior during which he met 
Bouteflika and Boumediene, that ‘none of the people I met had read Sartre’.5 While 
Lanzmann appears to have taken literally Fanon’s characterization of the fighters of the 
interior as ‘readers of the Critique’ (and indeed, the first of Fanon’s two statements, assuming 
it is an accurate recollection, would encourage such an interpretation), it is possible that 
Fanon meant that the fighters were readers in another sense, namely that the Critique was 
truly meant for such as them, that they were the ones for whom it was truly relevant. 
Whatever Fanon meant and whatever the precise timescale involved, the circumstantial 
evidence provided through Lanzmann’s various accounts strongly indicates that the Critique 
was viewed by Fanon as a profoundly significant piece of work, with clear relevance to the 
situation in Algeria and further afield, during the time when Fanon was completing Les 
Damnés de la terre. 
This strong circumstantial evidence is cited in a number of recent works of criticism 
as background to textual explorations of the relationship between the Critique and Les 
Damnés de la terre.6 David Macey, for example, draws on the accounts by Beauvoir and 
Cohen-Solal to support his assertion that the Critique ‘was to be the main theoretical 
influence on [Fanon’s] Les Damnés de la terre’,7 and he goes on to explore the parallels 
between Fanon’s and Sartre’s ideas (notably regarding violence) and Fanon’s adoption of 
some of the technical terms used in the Critique, such as ‘project’ and ‘praxis’.8 Ben 
Etherington takes up Macey’s arguments, recapitulating the circumstantial evidence and 
proposing a more detailed textual analysis of the two works to illustrate his view that Fanon’s 
approach – and more specifically his conceptualization of decolonization – underwent a 
 
 
significant shift between L’An V de la révolution algérienne and Les Damnés de la terre, 
attributing this shift not only to Fanon’s growing pessimism about the prospects of 
decolonization but also, crucially, to his encounter with the Critique.9  
Another sustained engagement with the textual parallels between the Critique and Les 
Damnés de la terre is put forward by Robert Bernasconi. Once again, the starting point for 
the analysis is the circumstantial evidence provided by Cohen-Solal, on which Bernasconi 
draws to argue that ‘Fanon was not only one of the first readers of Sartre’s Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, but also one of its most keen readers’.10 He also highlights the ways in 
which Fanon’s and Sartre’s ideas coalesced around their view of ‘racism as a system’, their 
‘appreciation for the dialectical reciprocity of antagonism’ and their concerns with the 
‘genesis of groups and the problem of keeping them together’.11 Bernasconi further suggests 
that the title of Les Damnés de la terre may be drawn, not from L’Internationale or even 
Jacques Roumain’s poem ‘Nouveau sermon nègre’,12 but from a sentence from Sartre’s 
Critique,13 and he goes so far as to argue that Les Damnés de la terre ‘confronted Sartre with 
his limits’ and may have contributed to the fact that Sartre never finished writing the 
Critique.14 
While Bernasconi’s conclusion is tantalizingly provocative, I want here to focus not 
so much on Bernasconi’s arguments, but on the way in which they are expressed, drawing 
attention to an aspect of Bernasconi’s article that may seem peripheral, but which I shall 
demonstrate to be of crucial and generally overlooked importance. In a discussion of the 
parallels between Sartre’s and Fanon’s ideas on the unifying and reality-changing functions 
of violence, Bernasconi cites a sentence from Les Damnés de la terre, arguing that ‘one 
cannot fail to hear Sartre in this last phrase’.15 What is significant about Bernasconi’s 
argument here is not its content – with which I think it would be hard not to agree – but the 
 
 
way in which he presents it, for in order to make his point he alters the English translation of 
the extract quite considerably: 
My interest here is in how violence not only creates the group but transforms reality. ‘The 
colonized discovers the real (le réel) and transforms it in the movement of his praxis, in his 
exercise of violence, and in his project of liberation’ (DT 89; WE 21. Translation modified). 
Again one cannot fail to hear Sartre in this last phrase, even if the choice of the word 
libération in place of the more Sartrean liberté once again marks a certain divergence.16 
 
When Bernasconi draws attention to the dissimilarity between the Sartrean liberté and the 
Fanonian libération, a strange muddying of linguistic waters takes place. For in the modified 
extract which Bernasconi quotes, neither libération nor liberté is present; rather, what is 
present is the English term ‘liberation’. What is more, in the published English version from 
which Bernasconi is quoting and which he has had to modify in order to ‘hear Sartre’ – 
namely that by Constance Farrington, first published in 1963 – the English ‘liberation’ is not 
present at all, and neither are the terms ‘real’, ‘le réel’, ‘praxis’ or ‘project’. Farrington’s 
version of the sentence cited by Bernasconi reads as follows: ‘The native discovers reality 
and transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into the practice of violence and into his 
plan for freedom.’17 While Bernasconi refers only to the self-evidence of hearing Sartre in the 
last phrase, presumably referring to the expression ‘project of liberation’, his restoration of 
Sartrean terminology to the rest of the sentence indicates his awareness that Sartre can be 
clearly heard in other turns of phrase too. What Bernasconi fails to acknowledge is that while 
a reader of the French original might be highly likely to ‘hear Sartre’ in Fanon’s words, a 
reader of Farrington’s version who has no access to the French original almost certainly 
would not, since there are no terminological clues to point her in Sartre’s direction; indeed, 
the entire force of the argument has taken on a different direction on account of the 
translation of ‘dans’ as ‘into’ rather than ‘in’. When Bernasconi concludes that ‘the 
similarities in their [Fanon’s and Sartre’s] language and ideas […] have not been given the 
attention they deserve’,18 he once again glosses over the question of translation, for in their 
 
 
English versions, the language of the Critique of Dialectical Reason and the language of 
Farrington’s The Wretched of the Earth share very few similarities, and parallels between the 
ideas presented in the two texts are consequently either not present – the dissolution of 
Sartrean concepts in Fanon dissolving essential aspects of his ideas – or are far harder to 
identify.19 
The question of the inadequacy of Farrington’s translation with regard to Sartre’s 
terminology is an issue that Macey mentions explicitly, and Etherington in passing, the 
former arguing that the unity of Les Damnés de la terre ‘is supplied by a philosophical 
framework derived from Sartre, but it is not always visible in the text itself and disappears in 
the flawed English translation’,20 and the latter taking care to mark up alterations to citations 
from the Farrington translation in order to show where and how the debt to Sartre is 
obscured.21 However, neither Macey nor Etherington explores the detail and implications of 
Farrington’s translation choices, which is precisely what I shall do now, focussing on those 
sections of Les Damnés de la terre where the links to the Critique are most strongly evident.  
 
Sartrean terminology in Les Damnés de la terre 
In order to give an accurate impression of the extent of Fanon’s adoption of Sartrean 
terminology, it is appropriate to start by outlining what Fanon does not do: where Sartre’s 
Critique is replete with conceptually dense terms, such that the work itself has been variously 
described as ‘monstrous’ and ‘indigestible’,22 Les Damnés de la terre is for the most part 
couched in straightforward, everyday language. Fanon does not use terms such as le practico-
inerte, le groupe en fusion, l’être-dans-le-groupe, la sérialité or many of the other 
neologisms that Sartre develops in the Critique, even if the ideas that he explores share 
certain parallels with those explored by Sartre. Rather, Fanon’s use of Sartrean terminology 
 
 
coalesces around three main terms: praxis, projet and totalisation/totalisant/totaliser. Of 
these, his use of praxis is the most noticeable and frequent. 
A survey of the occurrences of these terms in Les Damnés de la terre offers important 
textual evidence regarding the composition of the text. As Etherington observes, praxis is a 
term which is new to Fanon; it did not appear in L’An V de la révolution algérienne and its 
presence in Les Damnés de la terre acts as textual confirmation of the circumstantial 
evidence concerning the influence of the Critique on Fanon in 1960–1.23 Totalisation and its 
variations are similarly new to Fanon, and projet, in the specific sense intended by Sartre, had 
also not been used in previous works. Fanon does not, however, draw on these terms 
throughout Les Damnés de la terre, but only in specific places, notably in the second half of 
‘De la violence’ (particularly the final pages of the main section), the concluding paragraphs 
of ‘Grandeur et faiblesses de la spontanéité’, the opening and conclusion of ‘Mésaventures de 
la conscience nationale’ and the ‘Conclusion’. That Les Damnés de la terre is made up of 
material composed at different points in time is well-known,24 and the absence of Sartrean 
terms derived from the Critique in this earlier material is unsurprising; what is significant 
about the distribution of the Sartrean terms in the remainder of the material, however, is that 
large sections of the later material do not show any obvious textual traces of an engagement 
with the Critique. The pattern of use of the Sartrean terms indicates that it was only a section 
of ‘De la violence’ that was significantly developed or re-developed in light of a sustained 
engagement with the Critique – a hypothesis that certainly tallies with other textual evidence, 
notably the inclusion of the only footnote with a direct reference to the Critique, as well as 
with analyses of content. The limitation of Sartrean terms to the very opening and/or closing 
paragraphs of the other chapters indicates either that Fanon saw Sartre’s ideas as of less 
relevance to other aspects of his own thinking or – more likely, perhaps – that he simply did 
not have time to re-work the chapters in light of his engagement with the Critique. Either 
 
 
way, this rather limited use of the Sartrean terms may call into question Macey’s 
characterization of the Critique as ‘the main theoretical influence on Les Damnés de la 
terre’;25 it may also lend support to Bernasconi’s contention that the parallels between 
Fanon’s and Sartre’s ideas that are revealed through an analysis of the content of the two 
texts are more a result of simultaneous developments in their thinking.26 
In the sections that follow, I shall offer a close textual analysis of the final pages of 
the main part of ‘De la violence’, drawing out the implications of Farrington’s renderings in 
light of a reading of Fanon informed by the Critique. Two core themes take centre stage in 
these final pages: the first concerns the effects of violence on the group, stressing the unifying 
power of violence; the second concerns the effects of violence on the individual, with 
particular emphasis on the connection between violence and reason. Both of these themes 
find strong resonances with Sartre’s discussion of violence in the Critique, and in both the 
link with the concept of praxis is crucial. 
 
The unifying power of violence 
In one of the most well-known passages from ‘De la violence’ – indeed from Les Damnés de 
la terre as a whole – Fanon sets out the Manichaeistic opposition between colonizer and 
colonized, the colonized having realized that ‘il n’y avait rien à attendre de l’autre bord’: 
Le travail du colon est de rendre impossibles jusqu’aux rêves de liberté du colonisé. Le 
travail du colonisé est d’imaginer toutes les combinaisons éventuelles pour anéantir le colon. 
Sur le plan du raisonnement, le manichéisme du colon produit un manichéisme du colonisé. 
À la théorie de ‘l’indigène mal absolu’ répond la théorie du ‘colon mal absolu’. 
L’apparition du colon a signifié syncrétiquement mort de la société autochtone, 
léthargie culturelle, pétrification des individus. Pour le colonisé, la vie ne peut surgir que du 
cadavre en décomposition du colon. Telle est donc cette correspondance terme à terme des 
deux raisonnements. 
Mais il se trouve que pour le peuple colonisé cette violence, parce qu’elle constitue 
son seul travail, revêt des caractères positifs, formateurs. Cette praxis violente est totalisante, 
puisque chacun se fait maillon violent de la grande chaîne, du grand organisme violent surgi 
comme réaction à la violence première du colonialiste. Les groupes se reconnaissent entre 
eux et la nation future est déjà indivise. La lutte armée mobilise le peuple, c’est-à-dire qu’elle 
le jette dans une seule direction, à sens unique. […]  
 
 
La violence du colonisé, avons-nous dit, unifie le peuple. De par sa structure en effet, 
le colonialisme est séparatiste et régionaliste. […] La violence dans sa pratique est totalisante, 
nationale. De ce fait, elle comporte dans son intimité la liquidation du régionalisme et du 
tribalisme.27 
 
In this passage, Fanon shows that there are two kinds of violence to be distinguished from 
each other: that of the ‘colon’ and that of the ‘colonisé’. The colonized’s violence is called 
forth by ‘la violence première du colonialiste’, echoing in slightly weaker form Sartre’s 
argument in the Critique that ‘la violence de l’insurgé, c’est la violence du colon: il n’y en a 
jamais eu d’autre’.28 Crucially, it is the violence of the colonized (‘cette violence’), not 
violence in general, that Fanon argues to have positive qualities (‘Cette violence, parce 
qu’elle constitue son seul travail, revêt des caractères positifs, formateurs’). Fanon’s 
characterization of the colonized’s violence as ‘work’ here picks up on his earlier assertion 
that ‘travailler, c’est travailler à la mort du colon’.29 By characterizing violence as work, 
Fanon stresses not only the dialectical relationship between the colonizer and colonized (‘le 
travail du colon’, ‘le travail du colonisé’) and the outcome of that dialectical opposition (‘la 
nation’), but also the purposeful nature of ‘cette violence’. Just as Sartre defines work as 
something that finds its meaning in an end – ‘le sens du travail est fourni par une fin’30 – so 
Fanon is arguing that the violence of the colonized finds meaning in its goal; just as Sartre 
argues that ‘need’ can be seen not simply as the push factor driving people to work, but as the 
goal of work itself – ‘le besoin, loin d’être un vis a tergo qui pousserait le travailleur, est au 
contraire le dévoilement vécu d’un but à atteindre’31 – so Fanon is stressing the fact that the 
violence of the colonized is to be seen as part of a fight against ‘la misère, l’analphabétisme, 
le sous-développement’.32  
Work is also, in Sartre’s analysis, the means by which inorganic matter is reworked 
and transformed, and as such it is closely linked to his definition of praxis: ‘On définit la 
praxis comme projet organisateur dépassant les conditions matérielles vers une fin et 
s’inscrivant par le travail dans la matière inorganique comme remaniement du champ 
 
 
pratique et réunification des moyens en vue d’atteindre la fin.’33 In this analysis, work is the 
means by which praxis, which is itself always goal-oriented, achieves its purpose. In a 
famous section of the Critique in which Sartre presents his analysis of the storming of the 
Bastille, the praxis of the individual becomes the praxis of the group, and the individual not 
simply an individual, but an ‘individu commun’: 
Mais nous voyons maintenant en cet orateur penché vers des visages renversés et qui crie: ‘A 
la Bastille!’, l’individu commun (c’est-à-dire dont la praxis est commune) donner à la foule 
entière l’unité biologique et pratique de son organisme comme la règle de l’unification 
commune: nous verrons plus tard, en effet, l’unité commune, comme totalisation en cours, 
tentant de se réaliser comme individualité.34 
 
Sartre’s emphasis here is on how unity is achieved; his reference to the crowd as an organism 
that has biological and practical unity finds a clear echo in the passage by Fanon cited above 
(‘chacun se fait maillon violent de la grande chaîne, du grand organisme violent’). 
Furthermore, Sartre’s reference to the group’s communal unity as ‘totalisation en cours’ – a 
term he uses earlier in the Critique to define ‘la Raison dialectique’ itself35 – is echoed in 
Fanon’s repeated description of the colonized’s praxis as ‘totalisante’, stressing the dialectical 
process and the move towards what Sartre calls ‘la synthèse la plus rigoureuse de la 
multiplicité la plus différenciée’.36 
Farrington’s translation of this passage from ‘De la violence’ obscures many of these 
links to the Critique: while the characterization of violence as work is retained, the terms 
praxis and totalising are translated using the everyday terms ‘the practice of violence’ and 
‘binds together as a whole’ or ‘all-inclusive’. It is in the final paragraphs of the longer section 
quoted above that Farrington’s distancing of the text from its Sartrean influences becomes 
most apparent: 
But it so happens that for the colonized people this violence, because it constitutes their only 
work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence 
binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a 
part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards in reaction to the settler’s 
violence in the beginning. The groups recognize each other and the future nation is already 
indivisible. The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to say, it throws them in one way 
 
 
and in one direction. […] We have said that the native’s violence unifies the people. By its 
very structure, colonialism is separatist and regionalist. […] Violence is in action all-
inclusive and national.37 
 
The effect of Farrington’s replacement of ‘cette praxis violente’ with ‘the practice of 
violence’ is twofold. First, by using ‘the practice of’ instead of ‘praxis’, she replaces Fanon’s 
conceptualization of violence as human action towards a goal with violence as a way of 
operating: the crucial goal-related element of Fanon’s analysis disappears. And secondly, by 
shifting from ‘this violence’ to ‘violence’, she obscures the key distinction that Fanon is 
making between the violence of the oppressor and the responding violence of the oppressed: 
it is this latter kind of violence that has these positive effects, working as it does against its 
antithesis (colonial violence) towards its synthesis (the unified, independent nation). The 
replacement of ‘totalizing’ with ‘binds them together as a whole’ arguably allows Fanon’s 
words to retain more of their original meaning, retaining the emphasis on the unifying power 
of violence even while making the framework of dialectical reason within which Fanon’s 
arguments are couched less obviously apparent. The second rendering of the same term as 
‘all-inclusive’, however, does not sustain this emphasis on violence’s unifying properties, 
presenting it instead as something in which all can participate. While these shifts in meaning 
and emphasis undoubtedly contribute significantly towards what might be termed an 
intensification and simplification of the advocacy of violence in Les Damnés de la terre, an 
even more significant shift occurs through a mistranslation in the first line of the translated 
extract cited above: the original posits that ‘cette violence […] revêt des caractères positifs, 
formateurs’, thus echoing Sartre’s distinction between ‘fraternité (comme violence positive)’ 
and ‘terreur (comme violence négative)’;38 in Farrington’s translation, the French 
construction appears to have been misread, and rather than it being the violence that can take 
on such qualities, as in the original, it is the colonized people that are invested with such 
qualities as a result of their use of violence. The overall effects of this mistranslation and the 
 
 
removal of the complex Sartrean terms praxis and totalisant are threefold: first, Fanon’s 
comments on the unifying qualities of a particular kind of violence are made to apply to 
violence in general; secondly, the crucial link between violence and its purpose (change of 
the current system, unification of the people) is greatly diminished;39 and thirdly, rather than 
violence taking on positive qualities in specific circumstances, violence is seen as investing 
the characters of those using it with positive and creative qualities. 
 
Violence and reason 
While in Farrington’s translation the misreading of ‘cette violence […] revêt des caractères 
positifs, formateurs’ means that the arguments concerning the effects of violence on the 
group and on the individual become somewhat blurred, in Fanon’s original, the shift to the 
focus on the individual is clearly marked. After an extended focus on ‘le peuple’, Fanon 
announces a new paragraph with the words ‘Au niveau des individus’: 
Au niveau des individus, la violence désintoxique. Elle débarrasse le colonisé de son 
complexe d’infériorité, de ses attitudes contemplatives ou désespérées. Elle le rend intrépide, 
le réhabilite à ses propres yeux. Même si la lutte armée a été symbolique et même s’il est 
démobilisé par une décolonisation rapide, le peuple a le temps de se convaincre que la 
libération a été l’affaire de tous et de chacun, que le leader n’a pas de mérite spécial. La 
violence hisse le peuple à la hauteur du leader. […] Quand elles ont participé, dans la 
violence, à la libération nationale, les masses ne permettent à personne de se présenter en 
‘libérateur’. […] Totalement irresponsables hier, elles entendent aujourd’hui tout comprendre 
et décider de tout. Illuminée par la violence, la conscience du peuple se rebelle contre toute 
pacification. Les démagogues, les opportunités, les magiciens ont désormais la tâche difficile. 
La praxis qui les a jetées dans un corps à corps désespéré confère aux masses un goût vorace 
du concret. L’entreprise de mystification devient, à long terme, pratiquement impossible.40 
 
This passage, like the previous one, has many resonances with Sartre’s Critique, particularly 
with his analysis of the concrete, practical nature of the new awareness gained by those 
involved in revolutionary struggle: 
Chacun reconnaît en l’autre tiers la violence comme impossibilité consentie de retourner en 
arrière, de revenir au statut de sous-humanité et comme la perpétuation du mouvement 
violent qui l’a créé comme individu commun. Mais, bien entendu, cette reconnaissance est 
pratique et concrète. Elle est concrète parce que chaque tiers reconnaît les membres du 
groupe non en tant qu’hommes abstraits (ou spécimens abstraits du genre) mais comme 
 
 
assermentés d’une espèce singulière (liée aux circonstances particulières, aux objectifs, au 
serment).41 
 
Sartre outlines here the way in which violence creates ‘l’individu commun’, elsewhere 
defined as someone ‘dont la praxis est commune’,42 someone who no longer sees the struggle 
for freedom as someone else’s struggle but as her/his own. Sartre’s emphasis on the practical, 
concrete nature of this realization – others involved in the struggle are viewed not as abstract 
entities, but as real beings – finds a close echo in Fanon, who argues that violent struggle 
gives the masses ‘un goût vorace du concret’. This appetite for the concrete means that those 
involved in the liberation struggle view their co-fighters not as abstractions but as real people, 
and are no longer willing to hand over their own fate to any mystical ‘dieu vivant’ trying to 
set himself up as leader or liberator.  
Where Fanon’s assertions concerning the effect of violence at the individual level thus 
relate primarily to the taking of responsibility by the individual and the individual’s refusal to 
be duped in the period that follows on from the revolutionary struggle, Farrington’s 
translation of the passage opens up the possibility of a very different reading. In part, this 
opening up is facilitated by the simple, probably accidental omission of a line of the text: the 
sentence ‘La violence hisse le peuple à la hauteur du leader’, which might be viewed as the 
culmination of the argument that is being pursued in the first part of the paragraph, is omitted, 
with a corresponding weakening in the force and logical progression of Fanon’s argument. 
More significant, however, is Farrington’s decision to translate the opening line using the 
now infamous words ‘violence is a cleansing force’: 
At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his 
inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his 
self-respect. Even if the armed struggle has been symbolic and the nation is demobilized 
through a rapid movement of decolonization, the people have the time to see that the 
liberation has been the business of each and all and that the leader has no special merit. […] 
When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation they will allow no one to 
set themselves up as ‘liberators’. They show themselves to be jealous of the results of their 
action and take good care not to place their future, their destiny or the fate of their country in 
the hands of a living god. Yesterday they were completely irresponsible; today they mean to 
 
 
understand everything and make all decisions. Illuminated by violence, the consciousness of 
the people rebels against any pacification. From now on the demagogues, the opportunists 
and the magicians have a difficult task. The action which has thrown them into a hand-to-
hand struggle confers upon the masses a voracious taste for the concrete. The attempt at 
mystification becomes, in the long run, practically impossible.43 
  
The conceptualization of violence as a ‘cleansing’ force has been taken up by numerous 
groups and individuals to argue that Fanon promoted the cathartic benefits of violence for the 
individual.44 Yet Fanon’s choice of words here and the context of his reasoning are of crucial 
importance. Fanon does not talk of violence as cleansing or purifying but as detoxifying, a 
term which connotes the undoing of a harmful process that has already been done to the 
individual. The broader context of Fanon’s work leaves the reader in no doubt as to what this 
harmful process was: colonization, Fanon argues, condemned the colonized to immobility, to 
acts of violence against his own kind and to a preoccupation with the malevolent forces of 
spirits rather than with real enemies.45  
This controversial section is, in essence, a reprise of Fanon’s earlier argument that ‘[la 
décolonisation] porte sur l’être, elle modifie fondamentalement l’être […]. La décolonisation 
est véritablement création d’hommes nouveaux’.46 It also displays many parallels with the 
earlier section dealing with the move from a preoccupation with ‘irréalisme’ to ‘le réel’, 
which was cited by Bernasconi and discussed above: ‘Le colonisé découvre le réel et le 
transforme dans le mouvement de sa praxis, dans l’exercice de la violence, dans son projet de 
libération.’47 Farrington’s translation of this sentence – ‘The native discovers reality and 
transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for 
freedom’48 – not only masks the links to Sartre’s Critique, as argued above, but also alters the 
content of Fanon’s argument quite considerably: in the original, the colonized does not 
transform the real into a pattern or practice or plan; rather, the real is transformed in, or 
through, the colonized’s praxis, use of violence and project of liberation. The point that 
Fanon is making here is precisely the point that is reiterated in the later section on which we 
 
 
are focussing: during colonization, the colonized live in the colonial reality, which is in fact a 
false reality; in the process of revolutionary struggle, they both see and work towards a new 
reality, changing their understanding of themselves and their role as they do so.  
When Fanon speaks of violence as detoxifying, then, he is referring to its power to 
open the colonized’s eyes to the poisoning that has been done to him. This is not cleansing in 
some mysterious, cathartic way; it is the revelation of the reality of the colonized’s situation 
and is detoxifying in the sense that it brings reason and understanding where once there was 
pacification and mystification. A further expression of this argument can be found in the 
concluding paragraphs of the following chapter, ‘Grandeur et faiblesses de la spontanéité’: 
Le militant nationaliste […] découvre dans la praxis concrète une nouvelle politique qui ne 
ressemble plus du tout à l’ancienne. Cette politique est une politique de responsables, de 
dirigeants insérés dans l’histoire qui assument avec leurs muscles et avec leurs cerveaux la 
direction de la lutte de libération. […] C’est la lutte qui, en faisant exploser l’ancienne réalité 
coloniale, révèle des facettes inconnues, fait surgir des significations nouvelles et met le doigt 
sur les contradictions camouflées par cette réalité. Le peuple qui lutte, le peuple qui, grâce à 
la lutte, dispose cette nouvelle réalité et la connaît, avance, libéré du colonialisme, prévenu 
par avance contre toutes tentatives de mystification, contre tous les hymnes à la nation. Seule 
la violence exercée par le peuple, violence organisée et éclairée par la direction, permet aux 
masses de déchiffrer la réalité sociale, lui en donne la clef. Sans cette lutte, sans cette 
connaissance dans la praxis, il n’y a plus que carnaval et flonflons.49 
 
In this section, the emphasis is once more on the insights brought through revolutionary 
struggle and the new ability of the masses to anticipate and see through any attempts at 
mystification; this is goal-oriented action that is marked by knowledge, violence that is 
‘éclairée’, ‘connaissance’ in praxis. To return once again to Sartre, it is not the struggle on its 
own that is pivotal, it is the comprehension – of the Other and of the self – that takes place in 
and through the struggle: 
Comprendre dans la lutte, c’est saisir la praxis de l’Autre en immanence à travers sa propre 
objectivité et dans un dépassement pratique: cette fois, je comprends l’ennemi par moi et je 
me comprends par l’ennemi; sa praxis ne se manifeste pas comme pure temporalisation 
transcendante que je reproduis sans y participer: je la comprends directement et de l’intérieur 
par l’action que je produis pour me défendre contre elle. […] En chacun des deux 
adversaires, la lutte est intelligibilité; mieux encore, c’est, à ce niveau, l’intelligibilité même. 
Si elle ne l’était pas, la praxis réciproque serait par elle-même dénuée de sens et de fins.50 
 
 
 
Farrington’s rendering of the extract from ‘Grandeur et faiblesses’ once again 
obscures the link to Sartre’s work – praxis is translated as ‘real action’ and ‘practice of 
action’ – and consequently once again divorces violence from its purpose, since praxis is 
always distinguished from simple processes or actions by its focus on going beyond current 
material circumstances.51 Perhaps even more significantly, however, a mistranslation in the 
penultimate line alters the substance of the argument that Fanon is pursuing: 
The nationalist militant […] discovers in real action a new form of political activity which in 
no way resembles the old. These politics are the politics of leaders and organizers living 
inside history who take the lead with their brains and their muscles in the fight for freedom. 
[…] They are the essence of the fight which explodes the old colonial truths and reveals 
unexpected facets, which brings out new meanings and pin-points the contradictions 
camouflaged by these facts. The people engaged in the struggle who because of it command 
and know these facts, go forward, freed from colonialism and forewarned of all attempts at 
mystification, inoculated against all national anthems. Violence alone, violence committed by 
the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses 
to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that 
knowledge of the practice of action, there’s nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of 
trumpets.52 
 
Farrington’s rendition of the penultimate sentence is problematic: the subject of Fanon’s 
original sentence is not ‘seule la violence’, but ‘seule la violence exercée par le peuple, 
violence organisée et éclairée par la direction’. While the shift in meaning may seem slight on 
a first reading – after all, Farrington does include two further clauses describing the kind of 
violence that Fanon has in mind – it is potentially misleading, turning the elements that form 
part of the definition in the original into optional descriptive elements and allowing 
‘violence’ to stand in opposition to ‘non-violence’, rather than violence of a specific kind 
(that carried out by the people and marked by reason) to stand in opposition to violence of 
another kind, namely violence that is not carried out by the people, or that is without 
direction, goal or understanding, propelled simply by hatred, for, in Fanon’s own words, ‘la 
haine ne saurait constituer un programme’.53 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This analysis has highlighted a number of specific shifts in meaning that take place around 
the theme of violence through Constance Farrington’s translation of Les Damnés de la terre, 
the result most frequently of the rendering of complex concepts using everyday words, but 
also in some cases of mistranslations. This de-philosophization of Fanon’s text, however, has 
not only specific ‘local’ implications but also ‘global’ ones, operating at the level of the work 
as a whole. It is well known that Fanon’s text became a best-seller through its English 
translation, having a particularly significant impact in the United States through its popularity 
within the Black Power movement,54 but until now little attention has been paid to the 
connections between the textual choices made by the translator and the success of the book in 
English. The Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver is reported to have claimed that ‘every 
brother on a roof top’ could quote Fanon,55 and the speeches and writings of the Black Power 
movement are certainly not short of references to Fanon and Les Damnés de la terre, 
including those sections analysed here.56 Had Farrington retained the technical philosophical 
vocabulary used by Fanon, however, Les Damnés de la terre would probably have been less 
‘quotable’. A reader encountering the technical term ‘praxis’, for example, would have 
needed to ascertain where this term fitted within the broader tradition of usage and what 
exactly it meant. This would have constrained the reading process, making the text less 
straightforwardly applicable to other situations and perhaps acting to some degree as an 
inhibitor of slippages of meaning. While I am not arguing that Farrington’s translation 
choices alone were behind what Alice Cherki has termed ‘le dénigrement effarouché d’un 
Fanon apologiste de la violence’,57 I have sought to demonstrate that, rather than belonging to 
a footnote or being passed over in complete silence, those choices have a central place in the 
discussion, alongside such paratextual factors as Sartre’s notorious preface and the striking 
covers and subtitles used by the publishers in the 1960s.  
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